Legal responses to non-consensual smartphone recordings in the context of domestic and family violence by Douglas, Heather Anne & Burdon, Mark
2018 Legal Responses to Non-Consensual Smartphone Recordings 157
7  
LEGAL RESPONSES TO NON-CONSENSUAL SMARTPHONE 
RECORDINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF DOMESTIC AND FAMILY 
VIOLENCE 
 
 
HEATHER DOUGLAS* AND MARK BURDON** 
 
The increasingly ubiquitous use of smartphones is further 
complicating the legal response to domestic and family violence 
(‘DFV’). Perpetrators can now use smartphone recording facilities 
to record private conversations and activities of their (ex-)partners. 
Such behaviour may be a criminal offence of breach of a domestic 
and family violence protection order or stalking. On the other hand, 
those who have experienced DFV can record perpetrators and use 
the recordings in legal proceedings. The use of non-consensual 
smartphone recordings as evidence in DFV related cases is 
increasing and courts must determine when recordings are 
admissible. A key factor in making such determinations is whether 
the recording contravenes state-based criminal laws and listening 
and surveillance devices law. Drawing on reported experiences of 
the use of smartphone recordings in the context of DFV we show 
why further consideration and legal reform is needed if the law is to 
keep pace with this issue. 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
I've always got the phone in my pocket. I'm always armed, ready.1 
I said you can’t record me constantly … that’s like monitoring me.2  
Increasingly, domestic and family violence (‘DFV’) is understood as 
involving a complex pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour.3 Stark has 
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observed that coercive control includes structural forms of deprivation  
including the micro-regulation of everyday behaviour which, among other 
effects, subverts victims’ rights to privacy. For Stark, DFV is a liberty crime 
which creates conditions of ‘un-freedom’.4 He explains that there are four factors 
that distinguish coercive control from domestic assault: 
the extent to which its mode of oppression is embedded in objective structural 
constraints, its specific focus on enforcing gender stereotypes, its inextricable link 
to sexual inequality, and the extent to which it restricts autonomy and basic 
freedoms such as speech, movement and self-determination.5  
He references the United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision in 
Griswold v Connecticut, which established an affirmative protection against 
governmental intrusions into ‘zones of privacy’.6 These zones of privacy, Stark 
notes, ‘encompass many of the material and social conditions of equality and 
self-determination violated by coercive control’.7 Thus privacy can be understood 
as an aspect of freedom and autonomy, and coercive control as subverting the 
freedom of self-determination of the individual.  
In the DFV context, it is clear that the use of technology can enhance 
perpetrator possibilities for limiting a victim’s freedom. 8  There is a growing 
literature that has situated technology-facilitated abuse as DFV/coercive control. 
In the Australian context, research by Hand, Chung and Peters drew attention to 
the variety of information and communication technologies used by perpetrators 
to abuse and control their intimate or former intimate partners.9  Woodlock’s 
recent research identified the increasing use of technology, especially 
smartphones, by perpetrators to facilitate stalking and other forms of abuse in the 
context of DFV.10 Research has also found that sexting coercion can be a form of 
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Victoria, 2013). 
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10  Delanie Woodlock, ‘The Abuse of Technology in Domestic Violence and Stalking’ (2017) 23 Violence 
against Women 584, 599. See also Katrina Baum et al, ‘Stalking Victimization in the United States’ 
(Special Report, Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice, January 2009) 1, reporting that 
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intimate partner violence, providing perpetrators with another digital route for 
physical and sexual victimisation.11 Technology-facilitated abuse is becoming an 
increasingly important area of research in part because it is experienced by  
such a large proportion of women and also because, as technology has  
become cheaper and easier to use, technology-facilitated abuse has become 
increasingly prevalent. 12  This is especially so in the context of smartphones, 
given the widespread use of such devices and the ability of smartphone 
technologies to challenge established notions of public and private spheres, or 
‘zones’, as highlighted by Stark above. The application of privacy-related 
protections, in this context, is further complicated because privacy law has 
traditionally afforded greater protections to the private, rather than the public, 
sphere. 13  The once binary relationship between the private and privacy law 
protections accorded to such spheres is now widely recognised as problematic in 
the contemporary privacy law literature.14 Likewise, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that the applications of new technologies, such as smartphones, are 
impacting upon individual relationships within such spheres.15  
As this article shows, certain forms of technological output, such as 
smartphone recordings, can be used by both perpetrators and victims. 
Perpetrators can use non-consensual recordings for the purposes of  
coercively controlling their victim. However, victims are also employing  
non-consensual smartphone recordings of their abusive partners in an effort to 
protect themselves, and sometimes for evidence in subsequent legal  
proceedings. Accordingly, regulating the use of technology, and non-consensual  
smartphone recordings in particular, presents a conundrum for policymakers.16 
While technology can be used to perpetuate abuse it can also assist survivors to 
                                                                                                                         
the risk of stalking victimisation (the study including technology-facilitated stalking) was highest for 
individuals who were divorced or separated – 34 per 1000 individuals – and women were at greater risk 
than men for technology-facilitated stalking victimisation.  
11  Michelle Drouin, Jody Ross and Elizabeth Tobin, ‘Sexting: A New, Digital Vehicle for Intimate Partner 
Aggression’ (2015) 50 Computers in Human Behaviour 197.  
12  Jerry Finn and Teresa Atkinson, ‘Promoting the Safe and Strategic Use of Technology for Victims of 
Intimate Partner Violence: Evaluation of the Technology Safety Project’ (2009) 24 Journal of Family 
Violence 53, 53–4. 
13  Daniel J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1088, 1094. See also Law 
Reform Commission, Privacy, Report No 22 (1983) vol 2, 76 [1187]–[1188], representing the traditional 
perspective that privacy protections in relation to surveillance devices should not be accorded in public 
places where individuals could be expected to be observed, but would be accorded where there was a 
reasonable expectation of being safe from observation.  
14  See, eg, Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life 
(Stanford University Press, 2010); Julie E Cohen, ‘What Privacy Is for’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 
1904; Neil Richards, ‘The Dangers of Surveillance’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1934. 
15  See, eg, Karen Levy, ‘Intimate Surveillance’ (2015) 51 Idaho Law Review 679.  
16  As Graycar and Morgan point out, Western thought is characterised by dichotomies and binary 
oppositions, including private versus public; while the public sphere is associated with men and 
regulation, the private sphere is associated with women and family and, according to liberal thought, 
regulation should be avoided in this space: Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of 
Law (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 8–12. In the context of responding to domestic violence, the 
public/private dichotomy does not provide a clear resolution.  
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obtain the legal redress and safety they need.17 The fact that a non-consensual 
smartphone recording can be used for both positive and negative purposes makes 
judicial considerations about such recordings complex.  
Two similar non-consensual recordings, conducted by both perpetrator and 
victim in the context of DFV, can have very different purposes or uses and result 
in different legal consequences. How then are courts to differentiate between the 
two and determine whether a recording by an abuser is DFV and a form of 
stalking or intimidation, and whether a recording by a victim is for self-
protection or a contravention of relevant listening and surveillance device 
legislation?18  
The perspectives of survivors continue to be important in informing 
appropriate legal responses to DFV,19 and in this article we draw on interviews 
undertaken as part of a qualitative study involving women who have experienced 
DFV and have engaged with the legal system. Interviewees in this study 
explained how smartphone recording may help to increase their sense of safety 
and provide valuable evidence for legal proceedings. However, in contrast to this, 
some interviewees also reported that where abusive partners undertake recording, 
this may be experienced as intimidating and cause an abused person to be fearful. 
There are several legal responses to recording depending on the context. In some 
cases, a person’s act of recording may justify a criminal charge of stalking or 
intimidation. Depending on whether there is a domestic and family violence 
protection order (‘DFVO’) in place, and depending on the conditions of the 
DFVO, recording may be a breach of the DFVO. Finally, in some cases parties 
may seek to have the recording admitted into evidence and, in most cases, the 
deciding factor on admitting evidence seems to regard whether the recording is in 
breach of the various listening and surveillance devices legislation in place in 
each jurisdiction. In the next section, we provide some further background  
to the Leaving Domestic Violence Study.20 We then draw on the reports of the 
interviewees to frame our discussion of legal responses to recording as abuse and 
then to recording as a response to abuse, before highlighting the complex 
                                                 
17  Southworth and Tucker, above n 8; Jill P Dimond, Casey Fiesler and Amy S Bruckman, ‘Domestic 
Violence and Information Communication Technologies’ (2011) 23 Interacting with Computers 413, 
420; Hand, Chung and Peters, above n 8, 9; Woodlock, ‘The Abuse of Technology’, above n 10, 599. See 
also the importance of recording police interviews: Nina Westera and Martin Powell, ‘Prosecutorsˈ 
Perceptions of How to Improve the Quality of Evidence in Domestic Violence Cases’ (2017) 27 Policing 
and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy 157; Nina Westera, ‘Want the Best 
Evidence for Victims of Domestic Violence? Press the Record Button’ (2016) 70 Australian Police 
Journal 8. Note recent developments in New South Wales allowing the admission of police-recorded 
statements as evidence in chief: see Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ch 6 pt 4B. 
18  Thus, this article analyses the potential effects of the current laws that may be applicable in the context of 
DFV and smartphone recordings, and highlights its unintended consequences. 
19  Jennifer R Weis and Hillary J Haldane, ‘Ethnographic Notes from the Frontlines of Gender-Based 
Violence’ in Jennifer R Weis and Hillary J Haldane (eds), Anthropology at the Front Lines of Gender-
Based Violence (Vanderbilt University Press, 2011) 1, 2; Liz Kelly and Nicole Westmarland, ‘Naming 
and Defining “Domestic Violence”: Lessons from Research with Violent Men’ (2016) 112 Feminist 
Review 113, 117.  
20  Heather Douglas, Using Law and Leaving Domestic Violence Project (2014–17) TC Beirne School of 
Law <https://law.uq.edu.au/research/our-research/using-law-and-leaving-domestic-violence> (‘Leaving 
Domestic Violence Study’) (copies of transcripts on file with author Douglas). 
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concerns for courts in adjudicating legal responses to DFV involving smartphone 
recordings. 
 
II   USING LAW AND LEAVING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STUDY 
Throughout 2014–17 a qualitative study was conducted by author Douglas 
involving interviews with 65 women in Brisbane, Australia who had experienced 
DFV and engaged with the legal system. We refer to the study as the Leaving 
Domestic Violence Study. While the objective of the study was to explore 
women’s experiences of engaging with multiple legal processes, 29 women 
identified that they had been recorded by their abusive partner and/or that they 
had recorded their abusive partners. This article draws on the interviewees’ 
reports on their experiences of recording their violent partners or being recorded 
by their violent partners to illustrate some of the legal issues that arise in this 
context.  
In recruiting for the Leaving Domestic Violence Study the women were 
initially approached by their DFV support workers or lawyers from a range of 
organisations in Brisbane, Australia who discussed the proposed study with them. 
The women are all over 18 years old, had in the past six months leading up to the 
first interview experienced a violent relationship with an intimate partner and 
engaged with the legal system in some way to respond to the violence. Support 
workers or lawyers arranged interviews if the woman was interested in 
participating. A narrative interviewing style was used to encourage the 
participants to tell their stories and describe their experiences in detail at their 
own pace and as accurately as possible.21 Interviews were between 40 to 90 
minutes in length and were recorded and transcribed with the participants’ 
consent. The interviews were analysed thematically. Pseudonyms are used when 
referring to the participants’ comments and some details have been changed to 
protect the anonymity of the interviewees. The women’s comments cannot be 
understood as a definitive description of the way victims and perpetrators of 
domestic abuse and use recording technologies in their relationships with  
one another.22 This article does not purport to report on the Leaving Domestic 
Violence Study in any depth. Rather, the interviewees’ comments about their 
experiences of the use of smartphone recordings are used simply to illustrate the 
range of complex issues that must be negotiated in legal responses. 
 
                                                 
21  See Martine B Powell, Ronald P Fisher and Rebecca Wright, ‘Investigative Interviewing’ in Neil Brewer 
and Kipling D Williams (eds), Psychology and Law: An Empirical Perspective (Guilford Press, 2005) 11; 
Uwe Flick, Designing Qualitative Research (SAGE Publications, 2007). 
22  See Robert Dingwall, ‘Accounts, Interviews and Observations’ in Gale Miller and Robert Dingwall (eds), 
Context and Method in Qualitative Research (SAGE Publications, 1997) 52. 
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III   PERPETRATOR RECORDINGS AND COERCIVE CONTROL 
As noted above, as part of the Leaving Domestic Violence Study, some 
women reported that non-consensual smartphone recordings were used by 
perpetrators as a form of domestic abuse. In this section, we set out some of the 
interviewees’ comments about this issue and then consider legal responses to this 
form of coercive control. 
 
A   Reported Experiences Regarding Perpetrator Recordings 
While all of the women involved in the Leaving Domestic Violence Study 
reported experiencing multiple forms of abuse, 14 of the women reported that 
their partner or ex-partner recorded them as part of their effort to intimidate and 
control them.23 For some women, recording happened only once in the context of 
a coercive and controlling relationship. For example, Angelina had obtained a 
temporary DFVO that required her ex-partner to stay away from her. He had 
come to the house and recorded Angelina at the front door telling him ‘you’re not 
allowed to talk with me’.24 He then stood out the front of her apartment taking 
pictures of the apartment and her car. Angelina described this behaviour as 
intimidating.  
For other women, their partner’s recording of them was a systematic part of 
their coercive and controlling behaviour. Women reported that sometimes the 
recording was done openly, but without their consent and at other times women 
reported that they discovered that the recordings had been undertaken covertly. 
Pari reported that her husband was extremely jealous. In giving an example of his 
jealousy, she explained that on one occasion she had accidentally bumped into a 
friend’s husband at the library and began a conversation with him. Her husband 
arrived at the library and accused her of having an affair and then began to record 
the conversation. Pari explained that the situation within the relationship 
gradually became more controlling and she later realised that she was being 
constantly spied on and stalked by her husband. Pari reported: ‘he said that “I'm 
recording all your calls” … if we are talking normally also, he used to record that 
as well’.25  
Similarly, Leah reported that towards the end of the relationship the whole 
house was wired up with recording devices, some devices obvious, some secretly 
installed. Leah explained that there were recording devices around the house: ‘he 
had a recording watch, video and audio sensor right in front of the shower … 
after coming home he would just plug it in … play it back’.26 Leah tried to resist 
being recorded: ‘I broke them, I turned them off. I confronted him’, but he would 
replace the devices. Martha explained that she was being constantly recorded by 
                                                 
23  This figure does not include women who experienced other forms of technology-facilitated abuse 
including GPS tracking, texting and monitoring of their internet use and social media.  
24  Interview with Angelina (Brisbane, 11 December 2014); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, 
above n 1. 
25  Interview with Pari (Brisbane, 9 March 2013); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, above n 1. 
26  Interview with Leah (Brisbane, 14 September 2015); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, above 
n 1. 
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her partner and she confronted him: ‘I said you can’t record me constantly … 
that’s like monitoring me’.27 Fiona explained that during her abusive relationship 
her partner was jealous of others she spent time with and installed a recording 
device in her car and used this to record her conversations with passengers. This 
type of controlling behaviour continued after separation when her ex-partner 
broke into Fiona’s new house and covertly installed night vision cameras and 
recording devices throughout the house and underneath it. She eventually found 
the set top box hidden under pavers beneath the house and removed the devices. 
She does not know how long they were there before she removed them.  
 
B   Legal Issues – Stalking, Intimidation and Breach of DFVOs 
From the perspective of many of the interviewees, the recording behaviours 
described here were part of the coercive and controlling behaviour of the 
perpetrator and seemed to be undertaken for the purposes of harassment and 
intimidation or for monitoring. While many of these behaviours were reported to 
take place during the relationship, recording also took place after separation. 
While some recording was done openly, at other times it was covert. None of the 
women believed they had consented to the recording and they often actively 
resisted it once they became aware of it. Accordingly, these types of perpetrator 
recordings give rise to several legal issues. 
 
1 Potential Stalking and Intimidation Offences 
Many of the women interviewed for the Leaving Domestic Violence Study 
reported that the experience of being recorded by a partner or former partner was 
intimidating.28 Recording may, in some circumstances, be an offence of stalking 
or intimidation depending on the jurisdiction. Stalking is a particular concern in 
cases involving DFV as it has been identified as a serious risk factor for future 
harm.29 Since the 1990s, all Australian State and Territory jurisdictions have 
introduced the offence of stalking, in part as a response to DFV.30  
In all states and territories, with the exception of Western Australia,31 the 
definition of stalking (and intimidation in New South Wales) may be wide 
enough to encompass recording another person. Stalking is usually characterised 
by the repeated or protracted nature of the relevant act(s) or a combination of 
                                                 
27  Interview with Martha (Brisbane, 20 May 2015); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, above n 1. 
28  See also Roncevic v Boxx [2015] ACTSC 53, [70] (Penfold J). 
29  Judith McFarlane, Jacquelyn C Campbell and Kathy Watson, ‘Intimate Partner Stalking and Femicide: 
Urgent Implications for Women's Safety’ (2002) 20 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 51; Judith M 
McFarlane et al, ‘Stalking and Intimate Partner Femicide’ (1999) 3 Homicide Studies 300. 
30  For an overview of each jurisdiction, see: National Council to Reduce Violence against Women and Their 
Children, ‘Domestic Violence Laws in Australia’ (Report, June 2009) 171–8.  
31  In Western Australia, stalking is defined as ‘pursu[ing] … with intent to intimidate’: Criminal Code 
Compilation Act 1913 (WA) app B s 338E (‘Criminal Code 1913 (WA)’). ‘Pursue’ is defined as: 
repeatedly communicating with the person directly or otherwise; repeatedly following the person; 
repeatedly causing the person to receive unsolicited gifts; or watching or besetting a place where the 
person lives or works or approaching the place: at s 338D(1) (definition of ‘pursue’ para (a)–(d)). 
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relevant acts.32 In Victoria, Tasmania, the Northern Territory, South Australia and 
the Australian Capital Territory (‘ACT’), the act of stalking is defined broadly to 
include acts that could reasonably be expected to cause apprehension or fear in 
the stalked person.33 Notably, in the ACT case of Roncevic v Boxx, the offender 
was found guilty of stalking his former partner where the stalking behaviour 
included listening in on the victim’s encounters with her new sexual partner.34 In 
Queensland, and also the ACT, stalking behaviour may include intimidating, 
harassing or threatening acts.35 Similarly, in New South Wales, the offence of 
intimidation, defined as harassment or molestation, may in some circumstances 
encompass recording.36 In Henderson v McKenzie,37 Higgins CJ pointed out that 
harassment in the context of stalking is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900 
(ACT) or in the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT). His Honour suggested that it bore 
its ‘usual’ meaning: ‘“to trouble by repeated attacks; harry; (1) to worry or 
unnerve (an enemy) by continuous small attacks; (2) to disturb, worry, torment, 
distress with annoying labour, care or misfortune”; “Vex by repeated attacks; 
trouble, worry”’.38 These definitions of stalking and of intimidation would appear 
to be wide enough to capture recording in some of the contexts described by the 
women interviewed for the Leaving Domestic Violence Study. In their analysis of 
legislative definitions of domestic and family violence, the Australian Law 
Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) and New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
(‘NSWLRC’) identified that intimidation is defined variously to include conduct 
that causes reasonable apprehension or fear and in DFVO legislation it is usually 
a sub-category of emotional abuse.39 
A variety of reasons may be given for recording in circumstances where there 
has been DFV and it may be difficult to prove that the offender subjectively 
intended to cause the victim to fear or apprehend harm. While the fault elements 
of stalking vary between jurisdictions, generally the offence of stalking does not 
                                                 
32  Repeated or protracted: see Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) sch 1 s 359B(b) (‘Criminal Code 1899 (Qld)’). 
‘Course of conduct’: see Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) sch 1 s 192 (‘Criminal Code 1924 (Tas)’); 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 21A(2). ‘Repeated’ or combination of acts: see Criminal Code 1983 (NT) sch 1 s 
189(1) (‘Criminal Code 1983 (NT)’). Repeated: see Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 35(2); Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 19AA(1)(a). 
33  Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 189(1)(g); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 19AA(1)(a)(v), 
(vi); Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) ss 192(1)(d), (f); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 21A(2)(f)–(g). Note also the 
stalking offence is ‘aggravated’ where it takes place in the context of previous or current intimate 
partners: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 35(2)(i); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 5AA(1)(g).  
34  [2015] ACTSC 53, [70] (Penfold J). The stalking also included the offender’s installation of a tracking 
device on the victim’s car so he could track her movements. 
35  Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 35(2)(j); Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 359B(c)(vi). The stalking offence was 
introduced alongside other amendments to the ACT’s domestic violence legislation in 1996: see the 
discussion in Henderson v McKenzie [2009] ACTSC 39, [7] (Higgins CJ). 
36  Crimes (Domestic and Personal) Violence Act 2007 (NSW) ss 7, 13. Note that in NSW, stalking is 
defined narrowly to encompass watching or frequenting of the vicinity of the victim, and would not 
encompass recording: see Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s 8. 
37  [2009] ACTSC 39. 
38  Ibid [6] (citations omitted).  
39  Australian Law Reform Commission and New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Family Violence: 
A National Legal Response, ALRC Report No 114, NSWLRC Report No 128 (2010) vol 1, 197–9 
[5.35]–[5.40] (‘Family Violence: A National Legal Response’). 
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require proof of the subjective intent of the offender. In the Northern Territory, 
Tasmania and Victoria, if there is sufficient evidence that the offender carried out 
the stalking behaviour, that the behaviour caused fear or apprehension of harm in 
the stalked person and that an ordinary person would have been aware that such 
behaviour was likely to cause fear or apprehension of harm, the offence will be 
made out.40  
Notably in some jurisdictions, it is not necessary to prove that the stalked 
person feared or apprehended harm even where the subjective intent of  
the offender cannot be determined. For instance, in the ACT it will be sufficient 
if the accused person was reckless about whether his or her behaviour  
would be likely to cause apprehension or fear of harm in the stalked person.41 In 
Queensland, the accused person must intentionally direct the stalking behaviour 
at the stalked person but it is immaterial whether the accused person intended to 
cause apprehension or fear.42 It is also immaterial in Queensland whether the 
stalking behaviour actually caused the stalked person to be fearful.43 The test in 
Queensland is whether the purported stalking behaviour ‘causes detriment’ or 
‘would cause the stalked person apprehension or fear, reasonably arising in all 
the circumstances, of violence to, or against property of, the stalked person or 
another person’.44 Notably, Queensland case law has determined that the stalked 
person must become aware of the stalking behaviour ‘at some time’ although this 
awareness may come after the relevant act is complete.45 In Queensland, this may 
leave open the possibility for stalking to be charged in circumstances where the 
person has discovered they were recorded only after the recording is completed. 
In New South Wales, for a successful prosecution of the offence of intimidation, 
the Court must be satisfied that the accused intended to cause the other person to 
fear physical or mental harm. However, the provision also states that the offender 
is taken to intend to cause fear of physical or mental harm if he or she ‘knows 
that the conduct is likely to cause fear in the other person’.46 
In South Australia, the stalking behaviour must be carried out with intent to 
cause ‘serious’ apprehension, fear or harm or to harass the person stalked.47 In the 
context of a history of DFV it may be difficult to prove that the intent of the 
person carrying out recording was to cause serious fear, apprehension or harm to 
the person being recorded. In discussing the provision in Phillips v Police, 
Kourakis CJ considered the meaning of ‘serious’ and explained that the harm 
extends to: ‘an apprehension or fear of any adverse consequence which is 
accompanied by anxiety or emotional distress which interferes with a person’s 
                                                 
40  Criminal Code 1983 (NT) ss 189(1)–(1A); Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 192(3); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 
21A(3).  
41  Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 35(4). 
42  Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 359B(a), 359C(4). 
43  Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 359C(5). 
44  Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 359B(d). 
45  Taylor v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) (2009) 195 A Crim R 53, 59 (Applegarth J). 
46  Crimes (Domestic and Personal) Violence Act 2007 (NSW) s 13. 
47  Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 19AA(1)(b). 
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social, family or working life’.48 Whether or not this type of interference will be 
classified as ‘serious’ requires ‘an evaluative judgment by the tribunal of fact’.49  
Some of the women in the Leaving Domestic Violence Study reported 
apprehension and fear and in some cases their level of apprehension or fear could 
be determined to be ‘serious’. In any event, the intent may be focussed on intent 
to harass the person stalked. In Duffy v Google Inc, Blue J of the South 
Australian Supreme Court noted that the word ‘harass’ has a settled ordinary 
meaning, including to ‘trouble’, ‘worry’ or ‘disturb persistently’.50  This non-
consensual recording might be interpreted as a form of harassment in South 
Australia, but this would require that the perpetrator’s intent can be proven, 
which will often be very difficult to do.  
 
2 Protection Orders and Breach of a Protection Order 
Civil DFVOs are the most common legal response to DFV. Australian courts 
make over 80 000 DFVOs every year.51 The aim of DFVOs is to protect a person 
from future DFV. Generally, in order to obtain a DFVO, a person must satisfy 
the court there is a risk of future DFV and that a DFVO is needed to deter it. 
Where an application for a DFVO is successful, it will have certain conditions 
attached to it. Usually conditions will include a condition to be of good behaviour 
and not to perpetrate further DFV.52 The definition of DFV in DFVO statutes 
varies across states and territories but in all states and territories it is possible that 
non-consensual recording could fit the definition of DFV. In Victoria and 
Queensland, DFV includes behaviour towards an intimate partner that in any way 
‘controls or dominates’ the victim or causes them to feel fear,53 this definition 
would be broad enough to cover non-consensual recording.  
                                                 
48  (2016) 125 SASR 427, 435 [25]. 
49  Ibid 433 [21]. 
50  (2015) 125 SASR 437, 533–4 [415]–[417]:  
The word ‘harass’ has a settled meaning in ordinary parlance exemplified by dictionary definitions. The 
Oxford English Dictionary gives the following relevant definitions of the verb: 3. To trouble or vex by 
repeated attacks. To trouble, worry, distress with annoying labour, care, perplexity, importunity, 
misfortune, etc. The Macquarie Dictionary gives the following relevant definitions of the verb: 1. To 
trouble by repeated attacks, incursions, etc, as in war or hostilities; harry; raid; 2. To disturb persistently; 
torment, as with troubles, cares, etc. 
51  See, eg, Queensland Courts, ‘Magistrates Courts of Queensland: Annual Report 2014–2015’ (2015) 53 
(38 010 orders in year 2014–15); The Magistrates’ Court of Victoria, ‘Annual Report 2014–2015’ (2015) 
82 (final order numbers not available but at least 23 365 interim orders made in year 2014–15); Local 
Court of New South Wales, ‘Local Court of New South Wales Annual Review 2015’ (2015) 14 (26 009 
orders were made in 2015). See Annabel Taylor et al, ‘Domestic and Family Violence Protection Orders 
in Australia: An Investigation of Information Sharing and Enforcement’ (Landscapes: State of 
Knowledge Paper, Australia’s National Research Organisation for Women’s Safety, December 2015) for 
an overview. 
52  Karen Wilcox, ‘Recent Innovations in Australian Protection Order Law: A Comparative Discussion’ 
(Topic Paper No 19, Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse, 2010). 
53  Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) s 8; Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) 
s 5. 
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Furthermore, in Queensland, Victoria and Tasmania, the definition of DFV 
also includes emotional or psychological harm54 and it is conceivable that non-
consensual recording could cause emotional harm where the survivor is aware 
that it is being carried out. Intimidation is included in the Northern Territory, 
Western Australian and New South Wales definition of DFV55 and it is possible 
that this could capture some situations where non-consensual recording is carried 
out. Some DFVO statutes define DFV to include surveillance and monitoring,56 
and in some circumstances recording may be understood in this way. If recording 
is determined to be a form of DFV, then the behaviour could be a part of the 
DFV that justifies a court making a DFVO. Furthermore, non-consensual 
recording of a victim who has a DFVO in place could be determined to be a 
breach of the order and a criminal offence.57 For example, in the circumstances 
outlined by Angelina, the recording behaviour could have been charged as a 
breach of the temporary DFVO. In those cases where a DFVO has been made 
and where a specific condition of the DFVO is that the parties not record each 
other, any future recording would be a breach of the DFVO and a criminal 
offence.  
 
C   Summary 
Interviewees’ reports from the Leaving Domestic Violence Study illustrate 
that non-consensual recording is sometimes experienced as intimidating. As we 
have shown, in some cases, it may be possible for a person who engages in non-
consensual recording of their partner or ex-partner to be charged with an offence 
of stalking or intimidation, depending on the jurisdiction. Certainly in 
Queensland the circumstances presented by Leah and Fiona may have been 
sufficient to justify charges of stalking. Non-consensual recording may also be a 
form of DFV and underpin a DFVO. Furthermore, where a DFVO is in place, 
and non-consensual recording by the perpetrator continues, this may be a 
criminal offence of breach of a DFVO.58 However, as we explore below, non-
consensual recording may be justified and defensible in contexts where the 
person has a lawful interest in recording. Nevertheless, as we also show, the line 
                                                 
54  Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) s 8(1)(b); Intervention Orders (Prevention of 
Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) ss 8(1), (2)(b); Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) s 7(b)(ii); Family Violence 
Protection Act 2008 (Vic) s 5(1)(a)(ii). 
55  Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) s 5(c); Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) s 6(1)(d); 
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s 7(1). See also Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 
545B(2) (definition of ‘intimidation’): ‘the causing of a reasonable apprehension of injury to a person or 
to any member of his family or to any of his dependants, or of violence or damage to any person or 
property’. 
56  See, eg, Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) s 8(2)(h); Intervention Orders 
(Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) s 8(4)(k).  
57  See Australian Law Reform Commission and New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Family 
Violence: A National Legal Response, above n 39, ch 12.  
58  Although, on a practical level, the difficulty women face in seeking a criminal justice response in the 
context of DFV is well known: see Heather Douglas, ‘Do We Need a Specific Domestic Violence 
Offence?’ (2015) 39 Melbourne University Law Review 434; Adrian Howe, ‘The Problem of Privatised 
Injuries: Feminist Strategies for Litigation’ in Martha Albertson Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen 
(eds), At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory (Routledge, 1991) 148.  
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between non-consensual recording that is DFV and potentially a criminal 
offence, and where such behaviour is justified and defensible is far from clear.  
 
IV   VICTIM RECORDINGS FOR EVIDENCE AND 
PROTECTION 
As noted above, as part of the Leaving Domestic Violence Study, some 
women reported that non-consensual smartphone recordings were used by 
perpetrators as a form of domestic abuse. However, some women in the Leaving 
Domestic Violence Study also reported that they used their smartphone recordings 
as a form of protection from, and evidence of, abuse. In this section we set out 
some of the interviewees’ comments about this issue and then consider legal 
responses to this type of recording. 
 
A   Reports from Victims on How They Used Recordings 
Eighteen of the interviewees recorded their abuser’s behaviour. They had a 
variety of explanations for why they did this. They explained they recorded their 
ex-partner’s behaviours to collect evidence to prove abusive behaviour had 
occurred, to make sure they were believed and to feel safe. Their comments 
speak to a wider literature that shows the difficulty women face in being believed 
and being understood as credible in the legal system.59 While some of the women 
thought their recordings would be helpful in future court proceedings, there were 
a variety of other contexts in which they thought they might need evidence, 
including convincing themselves that their partner’s behaviour was abusive, 
confronting their partner, and talking to police or lawyers.  
For some women, the recordings, although sometimes covertly made, were 
for private use. Vera simply wanted proof that her partner was abusive. She  
said ‘I want to record because I really want evidence that he always verbally 
abused me. That is my reason’.60 Similarly, Rosa explained: ‘I have a recording 
about [the abuse] because people don’t believe me about what he’s like’.61 Some 
women suggested that recordings could be used to confront their partner with the 
problem behaviour in an effort to encourage change. Martha explained ‘there 
were times he was threatening me … when I would record him towards the end 
of it in the hope that we could try and work it out’.62 In her interview Susan stated 
that, as she left her partner for the last time, she recorded him: ‘he was calling me 
spiteful … and all sorts of things, so I just left him to it’.63 For her this was proof 
about why she left.  
Many of the women recorded their (ex-)partner’s behaviours to convince 
police, DFV support workers and lawyers that they were experiencing abuse and 
                                                 
59  See, eg, Rosemary Hunter and Kathy Mack, ‘Exclusion and Silence: Procedure and Evidence’ in Ngaire 
Naffine and Rosemary J Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (Law Book, 1997) 171, 173–4, 191. 
60  Interview with Vera (Brisbane, 13 March 2015); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, above n 1. 
61  Interview with Rosa (Brisbane, 16 October 2015); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, above n 1. 
62  Interview with Martha (Brisbane, 20 May 2015).  
63  Interview with Susan (Brisbane, 22 May 2015); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, above n 1. 
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therefore of their need for a DFVO. Maddy said ‘I’m just trying to keep a record 
… like a proof of reasons why I have a right to have the [DFVO] out on him 
instead of it just being my word against him situation’.64 She said, ‘I know the 
voice recordings … don’t really stand up in court from an evidence standpoint 
but I figured I could play them to my solicitor so they could see what I am 
dealing with’.65 In some cases, the women believed the recordings had enabled 
them to avoid protracted and stressful contested hearings in protection order 
matters. Jennifer reported that her recording of her ex-partner ‘threatening me 
was really … the straw that broke the camel’s back’.66 She explained that the 
recorded material had been shown to her ex-partner’s solicitor and had assisted 
her in obtaining a DFVO by consent. Jacinta had recorded her partner’s violent 
outburst and shown it to her DFV support worker who, according to Jacinta, said: 
‘“That’s all you need,” it was that bad’.67 Jacinta also believed that the recording 
convinced her ex-partner to consent to a DFVO. 
Research has suggested that criminal charges in cases involving DFV may be 
difficult to prove.68 Some of the women in this study recorded interactions with 
their violent partners in order to convince police and lawyers of the 
appropriateness of criminal charges. Roseanna had been severely abused by her 
ex-partner and her lawyer did not believe her. Roseanna had remained in 
telephone contact with the abusive partner and managed to record their telephone 
conversations. These eventually led to him making various admissions that were 
recorded and he was charged with criminal assaults arising from past incidents of 
DFV.69 Similarly, Laura and Jennifer recorded their partners’ abuse; they showed 
the recordings to the police and charges of breach of a DFVO were laid. Fiona 
reported that the day after she obtained a DFVO her ex-partner came to her house 
‘and they were taking everything. So I stood and recorded them … Then I rang 
the police’.70 Fiona believed the recording was pivotal in ensuring there was a 
breach of a DFVO charge laid. In several cases women reported that police 
encouraged them to make recordings of their partner’s abusive behaviour. Faith 
explained that a police officer who attended a call-out helped her to download a 
recording application on her phone and encouraged her to ‘start recording him’.71  
                                                 
64  Interview with Maddy (Brisbane, 24 June 2015); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, above n 1. 
65  Interview with Maddy (Brisbane, 24 June 2015). 
66  Interview with Jennifer (Telephone Interview, 31 March 2016); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case 
Studies, above n 1. 
67  Interview with Jacinta (Brisbane, 25 May 2015); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, above n 1. 
68  Douglas, ‘Do We Need a Specific Domestic Violence Offence?’, above n 58. 
69  Interview with Roseanna (Brisbane, 27 November 2015); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, 
above n 1. Such calls are often orchestrated as a part of the criminal investigation into sexual assault. 
Described as pretext calls, they can result in admissions and confessions that may be admissible at trial. 
See Jeremy Gans, ‘The Limits of the Christie Discretion’ (Paper presented at the Current Legal Issues 
Seminar: Issues of Discretionary Exclusion of Evidence, Supreme Court of Queensland, 13 October 
2016) <https://law.uq.edu.au/files/19271/The-limits-of-the-Christie-discretion.pdf>. 
70  Interview with Fiona (Telephone Interview, 1 July 2016); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, 
above n 1. 
71  Interview with Faith (Brisbane, 5 August 2015); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, above n 1. 
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Many parents report that abuse continues post-separation.72  Some women 
reported that they recorded the child handovers in part to keep themselves safe 
but also, if there was trouble, they would have evidence for future court 
proceedings. Sandra pointed out that handover is now the only contact she has 
with her ex-partner, apart from emailing, and she sometimes recorded the hand 
over to chronicle any issues. Similarly, Rosa said her partner could be abusive 
when he came to the house to collect their son. She said she recorded his yelling 
in case he tried to claim that she was breaching the DFVO. Milly explained that 
she started recording when her ex-partner ‘started being very nasty and verbally 
aggressive at our [child] drop-offs’.73 On some occasions, women did not have a 
specific expectation about how they would use the recording; rather recording 
was an important part of their protective arsenal. Ingrid explained: ‘It’s good that 
I keep recording … [you know] there’s more stuff to come’, 74  and Sandra 
explained: ‘I've always got the phone in my pocket. I'm always armed, ready’.75 
 
B   Listening and Surveillance Device Legislation and the Admissibility of 
Victim Recordings for Evidence  
1 History and Background  
The types of non-consensual recording detailed above give rise to  
potential contravention with various listening and surveillance device laws.  
Listening device legislation were the first privacy related laws to be introduced 
 in Australian jurisdictions, beginning in the early 1970s. 76  These laws were 
specifically concerned with the use of new technologies to eavesdrop or overhear 
private discussions.77 It is notable that when these laws were introduced their 
application in the context of DFV was not a consideration.78 Accordingly, the 
laws criminalised ‘listening device’ uses for the purposes of recording ‘private 
conversations’ without the consent of conversational participants. 79  However, 
despite this being the relevant criminal offence, it should be noted for the 
purposes of this paper, that courts tend to use the applicability of listening and 
surveillance device legislation as a means for deciding whether a recording 
should be admitted as evidence, rather than determining criminal liability on 
behalf of the recorder.  
As the use of different technologies developed so did concomitant privacy 
concerns, and some states extended the focus on listening devices to include 
surveillance devices.80 These laws extended the type of device use that could give 
                                                 
72  Rae Kaspiew et al, ‘Experiences of Separated Parents Study (Evaluation of 2012 Family Violence 
Amendments)’ (Report, Australian Institute of Family Studies, October 2015) 45. 
73  Interview with Milly (Brisbane, 5 May 2016); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, above n 1. 
74  Interview with Ingrid (Brisbane, 9 April 2015); Douglas, Domestic Violence Case Studies, above n 1. 
75  Interview with Sandra (Brisbane, 8 October 2015). 
76  See, eg, Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA). 
77  See Law Reform Commission, above n 13, vol 1, 342 [737]. 
78  Ibid vol 1, 342 [734]. 
79  Ibid vol 2, 47 [1127]. 
80  See, eg, Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NT); Listening and 
Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 
(WA). 
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rise to criminal sanction. The expansion of applicable devices also created new 
offences in relation to the non-consensual recording of ‘private activities’. As 
such, whilst the conceptual basis of the various legal frameworks remained 
similar, as regards harm prevention, the application of the different listening and 
surveillance devices laws started to fragment in terms of their foundational 
definitions, offence requirements and exemptions. So much so that the ALRC 
concluded that a uniform surveillance device law was now required in Australia 
to ameliorate the gaps and inconsistencies arising from the state-based regimes.81  
 
2 The Devices that Are Regulated 
Every state and territory currently regulates the use of listening and 
surveillance devices either by private individuals or by law enforcement 
agencies.82 In Queensland, a listening device is broadly defined under section 4  
of the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) as ‘any instrument, apparatus, 
equipment or device capable of being used to overhear, record, monitor or listen 
to a private conversation simultaneously with its taking place’.83 However, the 
ALRC’s concerns start to become visible when the other laws are considered. For 
example, the ACT and Tasmanian laws use different words to define the uses of 
a listening device – namely, to ‘record or listen’ – and also do not have a 
requirement for the recording to take place simultaneously, as in Queensland.84 
The type of device also varies amongst different jurisdictions. In Queensland, a 
listening device can be any instrument, apparatus, equipment or device,85 whereas 
in Victoria, a listening device can be ‘any device’86 and in South Australia it is an 
‘electronic or mechanical device’.87 
Given the breadth of definitions, it is perhaps not surprising that a wide range 
of devices have been identified as listening devices by various courts. In Steiner 
Wilson v Webster Pty Ltd v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd, a hidden 
microphone and camera employed by a television journalist was held to be a 
listening device under the ACT law.88 Similar audio recording devices, such as a 
digital dictaphone,89 a cassette recorder90 and a microphone91 have all been held to 
be listening devices, as has the use of such devices to record phone 
                                                 
81  Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Report No 123 
(2014) 78, 276–8. 
82  It should be noted that Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) only applies to law enforcement agencies 
when they are using surveillance devices under Commonwealth law and is thus not covered in this article.  
83  Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) s 4. 
84  Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 2 (definition of ‘listening device’); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) 
s 3(1).  
85  Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 2 (definition of ‘listening device’); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 
(Qld) s 4. See also Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) s 3; Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 3(1). 
86  Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 3(1). See also Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 4(1); 
Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NT) s 4(1) referring to ‘a device’. 
87  Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 3. 
88  (1999) Aust Torts Reports 81–537, 63 352 [319] (Crispin J). See also Farris v Boase [2013] WASC 227, 
[3] (Master Sanderson) regarding a recording device hidden in a glasses case.  
89  Alyssa Treasury Services Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] AATA 578. 
90  R v Bandulla [2001] VSCA 202. 
91  R v Regazzoli [1993] QCA 154. 
172 UNSW Law Journal Volume 41(1) 
conversations.92 A mobile phone has also been found to be a listening device  
in relation to hands-free use 93  and to record a phone conversation between 
participants.94  
 
3 Private Conversations and the Concept of Harm 
The first generation of listening device legislation focussed on the illicit 
recording of private conversations as the harm to be precluded. The primary 
offence of the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) is detailed in section 43(1). It 
states that ‘a person is guilty of an offence … if the person uses a listening device 
to overhear, record, monitor or listen to a private conversation’.95 Similar, but 
not exact, definitions are also found in the other listening device legislation. The 
South Australian offence also has a consent requirement, namely that the use of a 
listening device in relation to a private conversation is only an offence if it is 
done without the explicit or implied consent of the parties to the conversation.96 
The Tasmanian offence, whilst similar to that of Queensland, has no consent 
requirement but only includes the use of a device to record or listen.97 
The situation is further complicated by the requirement that offending 
recordings must be of ‘private conversations’, the definition of which, at least 
under section 4 of the Queensland Act, and some other laws,98 is protracted.99 
However, it is clear that the definition envisages potentially infringing material as 
being material in respect of which the recorded party expresses a desire not to be 
recorded, or – in the case of a private conversation – has a reasonable expectation 
that it will not be recorded without their consent, unless the recording is 
undertaken by a party to the conversation.  
Other listening device laws also employ different definitions, such as in 
South Australia, where a private conversation is ‘any conversation carried on in 
circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate that any party to the 
conversation desires it to be confined to the parties to the conversation’.100 The 
situation is even further complicated with the addition of the surveillance device 
legislation, which again has similar but different definitions of private 
conversation as outlined above in relation to the offence of listening device use. 
                                                 
92  De Costi Seafoods (Franchises) v Wachtenheim (No 2) [2012] NSWDC 286; W K v R (2011) 33 VR 516; 
Chao v Chao [2008] NSWSC 584. 
93  Ponzio v Multiplex Ltd (2005) 145 IR 431. 
94  De Costi Seafoods (Franchises) v Wachtenheim (No 2) [2012] NSWDC 286. 
95  Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) s 43(1) (emphasis added). 
96  Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 4. 
97  Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 3(1).  
98  See, eg, Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) s 3(1); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 3(1), and a 
similar definition in Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) Dictionary (definition of ‘private conversations’):  
any words spoken by one person to another person in circumstances that indicate that those persons desire 
the words to be heard or listened to only by themselves or that indicate that either of those persons desires 
the words to be heard or listened to only by themselves and by some other person, but does not include 
words spoken by one person to another person in circumstances in which either of those persons ought 
reasonably to expect the words may be overheard, recorded, monitored or listened to by some other 
person, not being a person who has the consent, express or implied, of either of those persons to do so. 
99  Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) s 4.  
100  Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 3 (definition of ‘private conversation’). 
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However, these laws also create a range of other offences regarding the use of 
different devices to record private activities.101  
Given the definitional differences, it is not surprising that judicial 
consideration of what is a private conversation varies considerably, particularly 
in the context of cases involving business dealings.102 There appears to be general 
agreement that the test to apply is objective, rather than subjective, in nature.103 
That said, some courts have taken an expansive position, whereas other decisions 
are much narrower in focus.104  
As the definition indicates, the conversation must be of a certain type, 
namely, it has to be private. In Thomas v Nash, Doyle CJ indicated that a 
conversation was private if it was intended to be confined to the parties or known 
participants in the conversation.105 ‘Private’ in the sense of the offence, therefore, 
does not connote ‘secret or confidential’ but is to be used in the context that it is 
not public.106 Doyle CJ also reiterated that the meaning of private conversation, in 
the context of the South Australian Act, did not require the provisioning of 
‘precise limits of the concept of a private conversation’.107 Moreover, and again 
in keeping with the beneficial nature of the legislation, which aims to provide a 
broad privacy protection,108 if a private conversation later becomes public, that 
would not preclude it from being classed as a private conversation.109  
However, that does not automatically mean that a conversation which  
takes place on private property will be a private conversation. Rather,  
whether a conversation is private or not will depend upon the ‘tenor of the 
conversation’110 and the intention of the participants, both of which have to be 
assessed objectively, on a case-by-case basis.111 Conversations which take place 
in environments or situations in which there is a reasonable expectation that the 
conversation will not be recorded, such as a doctor’s surgery, are more likely to 
be classed as private, even if the conversation could possibly be overheard.112 
However, a conversation between persons held in a prison cell at a watch-house 
                                                 
101  See, eg, Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 11; Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NT) s 12(1); 
Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) s 6(1).  
102  See, eg, Alliance Craton Explorer v Quasar Resources [2010] SASC 266, [31] (Sulan J); Georgiou 
Building Pty Ltd v Perrinepod Pty Ltd (2012) 261 FLR 211; Clarke v Edwards [2007] SADC 49; Violi v 
Berrivale Orchards Ltd (2000) 99 FCR 580. 
103  See, eg, R v East (2003) 13 NTLR 91, 97–8 [23]–[28]; Dimech v Tasmania (2016) 257 A Crim R 495, 
502–3 [33] (Estcourt J). Notably, in the context of this article, there is a long history of feminist criticism 
of objective versus subjective tests: see, eg, Graycar and Morgan, above n 16, 56–71.  
104  See, eg, Kelly J in Sands v South Australia [2013] SASC 44, [704] stating that the definition of private 
conversation was intended to be construed in a ‘very wide’ sense; cf Paull v Queensland All Codes 
Racing Industry Board [2016] QCAT 74, [31]–[33] (Senior Member O’Callaghan).  
105  (2010) 107 SASR 309, 316 [36]. 
106  Ibid 316 [37]. 
107  Ibid 316 [38]. 
108  See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 81, 277 referring to the historical basis of listening 
device laws as ‘protection from surveillance’ which ‘is a fundamental form of protection of privacy’. 
109  Sands v South Australia [2013] SASC 44; Thomas v Nash (2010) 107 SASR 309. 
110  Paull v Queensland All Codes Racing Industry Board [2016] QCAT 74, [33] (Senior Member 
O’Callaghan).  
111  See Right v Stevens [2009] WASC 102. 
112  Toth v DPP (NSW) [2014] NSWCA 133. 
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was not a private conversation because there could be no reasonable expectation 
that the conversation would not be overheard.113 
Ultimately, whether a conversation will be classed as a private conversation 
will depend on the circumstances, the intention of the parties and the 
expectations generated by the environment and the type of conversation 
undertaken. Put simply, if the recording or overhearing of a conversation is more 
likely to be deemed ‘sneaky’ then the discursive interaction is more likely to be 
classed as a private conversation because it is the very ‘sneakiness [of the 
recording that] makes it abhorrent to ordinary persons dealing with each other in 
a proper fashion’.114 However, there are exemptions and defences in the listening 
and surveillance device legislation to justify potentially infringing behaviour, 
based on whether the person recording a private conversation is a party to the 
conversation or, more importantly in the context of this article, whether the 
person has a lawful interest that justifies the recording.  
 
4 The Participant Monitoring and Lawful Interests Exemptions 
Some states, Queensland, Victoria and the Northern Territory allow for the 
surveillance of a private conversation or activity, if the person undertaking the 
recording or overhearing, is a party to the conversation.115 More controversially, 
such actions can take place without the consent of the other members of the 
conversation. 116  Section 43(2)(a) of the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) 
specifically exempts the use of a listening device where the person using the 
device is a party to a private conversation. Several decisions have also affirmed 
the scope of this exemption.117  
The lawful interests exemption is less controversial but it is more complex in 
application, as demonstrated through judicial decisions. A lawful interest 
exemption of this form currently exists in several jurisdictions and recognises 
that some forms of non-consensual recording can be undertaken to gather 
evidence of wrongdoing which can be used as evidence in future actions, where 
reasonably necessary.118 Section 7(3)(b)(i) of the New South Wales law exempts 
the use of a listening device in relation to a private conversation where the 
principal party making the recording consents and the recording is ‘reasonably 
                                                 
113  R v Henry [1992] QCA 336. 
114  Lever v Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (2009) 189 IR 362, 390 [103] (Drake 
SDP). 
115  Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 81, 279 [14.18]. 
116  Ibid 287 [14.49]. 
117  See, eg, Marigliano v Queensland Police Service [2016] QCAT 110, [31] (Member Krebs). See also 
family law Federal Court actions, based in Queensland: Hazan v Elias (2011) Fam LR 475, 479 [16]; 
Furnari v Ziegert [2016] FCA 1080, [31]. 
118  See, eg, Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 4(3)(b)(i); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 
7(3)(b)(i); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 7(1) (but note that this does not require 
that the person is a principal party, merely a party); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 5(3)(b)(i); 
Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 5(3)(d), 6(3)(b)(iii). It should be noted also that the lawful 
interests exemption is different to the public interest exemption found in several states. Lawful interest 
focuses specifically on the interests of the principal party whereas public interest has a societal 
application. 
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necessary for the protection of the lawful interests of that principal party’.119 The 
question accordingly shifts to what is ‘reasonably necessary’ in the context of 
such recordings. Again, as above, a number of judicial decisions have considered 
this issue and have come to differing conclusions about what actions deserve 
protection as a lawful interest, particularly in the context of DFV.  
The determination of a ‘lawful interest’ is an evaluative judgment120 to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, based on the facts.121 In cases that involve the 
use of non-consensual recordings to protect individuals from physical harm, 
judicial decisions have tended to require a direct link between the lawful interest 
entailed in non-consensual recording and the subsequent use of the recording for 
self-protection purposes. Not surprisingly, in these types of situations, the courts 
appear to have been more willing to identify a lawful interest in relation to the 
party undertaking the recording.  
Groom v Police (SA)122 regarded an appeal by an estranged male partner 
about a contravention of a DFVO during a child handover meeting in 2014. 
Previous to the meeting, there had been a significant history of DFV. The 
primary form of evidence adduced at first instance involved a surreptitious 
recording made by the appellant’s partner, SB, at the time of the handover. 
Nicholson J had to decide whether the audio recording was properly admitted 
into evidence and thus whether SB’s recording was a contravention of the 
Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) or whether SB had a lawful 
interest to make the recording under section 7(1)(b) of the South Australian Act.  
His Honour confirmed that if a surreptitious recording relates to a serious 
crime, then a court will more readily find that the recording was in protection of a 
person’s lawful interests.123 On its face, a breach of a DFVO may not, by itself, be 
a serious crime but such breaches ‘are capable of constituting serious crimes’.124 
Significantly, more paramount for Nicholson J, however, was SB’s concerns for 
her wellbeing in circumstances where she had ‘a genuine concern for [her] own 
safety’.125 This concern for individual safety had to be considered in the policy 
context of DFV and the use of DFVOs as a protective mechanism for victims. 
The DFVO is a ‘first step’ protection and thus respondents must be discouraged 
from contravening such orders as they would lose their protective value.126  
Other decisions have also favoured the protection of a recorder’s lawful 
interest involving this direct link between the recording and the use of the 
recording as a self-protective measure. Another South Australian case, R v 
Coutts127 regarded the use of illicit recordings for evidence in a criminal case of 
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rape and whether the recordings were conducted for a lawful purpose, as in 
Groom. The complainant made two surreptitious audio recordings on her mobile 
phone. The first involved an act of rape and sexual abuse by the accused. The 
second regarded a conversation between the complainant and the accused in the 
accused’s car. The parties did not contest whether the mobile phone was a 
listening device.128 Accordingly, the real issue before the Court was whether the 
complainant had a lawful interest in making the recordings to be used as 
evidence in the prosecution.  
Tilmouth J surveyed the existing South Australian and New South Wales 
case law, with particular focus on the nature of protection outlined in Sepulveda v 
The Queen.129 In that case, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal concluded that 
protection, in the context of lawful interests, entailed ‘defence from harm, danger 
or evil’.130 Tilmouth J did not specifically endorse this test but it appears to have 
been at the forefront of his considerations. His Honour concluded that, at the time 
of the rapes, the complainant was trapped in a violent relationship from which 
she had no escape.131 The only option available to her, in relation to the protection 
of her lawful interests, was the ability to make the surreptitious recordings that 
could be used as evidence in a subsequent prosecution. The decisions to make the 
recordings were made in the ‘spur of the moment’ in situations of ‘high and 
inherent risk of danger’.132 In other words, the danger had been set upon her and 
there was no possible consideration that the recording had been undertaken as a 
‘set-up or trap’,133 as in Sepulveda. Notably, in this case Tilmouth J also observed 
that even if the recording behaviour was determined to breach the listening 
devices legislation, a balancing of public policy considerations may still result in 
the recording being admissible.134  
R v Coutts is clearly a decision where the degree and reality of threat was 
very significant to the complainant. Other decisions have also found the existence 
of a lawful interest in situations where the immediate threat was not as severe. 
Corby and Corby135 regarded the use of four non-consensual audio recordings 
between the parties as evidence in a custody hearing. The applicant, the mother 
in the estranged partnership, contended that the respondent was sexually 
coercive, intimidating and physically violent during their relationship. 136  The 
question before Sexton J was whether the applicant had a lawful interest under 
section 7(3)(b)(i) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW).137 Her Honour 
decided that the applicant had a lawful interest in protecting herself from 
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intimidation, harassment and sexual coercion.138 Moreover, the recordings were 
reasonably necessary because, similarly to R v Coutts, it may not have been a 
realistic option to report her predicament to the police139 and the recordings were 
important evidence as they demonstrated the difference between the public and 
private ‘faces’ of the respondent.140 Further, and similarly to other cases, Sexton J 
observed that even if she had been unable to find that the mother had a lawful 
interest in making the recording, given the circumstances she would have 
exercised her discretion to admit the recordings in evidence.141  
Other courts have also found a lawful interest in the use of non-consensual 
recordings to protect children. Like Corby, Gawley v Bass142 regards the use of 
recordings as evidence in child custody proceedings before the Federal Circuit 
Court. The male applicant installed a listening device in the estranged family 
home in order to protect his children from the female respondent’s ‘violent 
temper and ill-treatment’.143  The respondent objected to the recordings being 
adduced on the basis that they were not in the principal party’s interests and were 
essentially a ‘fishing expedition’, and thus unreasonable.144 Sexton J decided that 
the applicant had a lawful interest in the protection of the children, because a 
father has ‘an obligation to protect not only his interests but also the interests and 
protection of the children’.145 In that sense, a father has a lawful interest ‘as  
a parent of the children to protect them from risk of harm’ 146  and thus the 
recordings were reasonably necessary. Similarly, in Latham and Latham, Le Poer 
Trench J decided that audio recordings made in the family home, were ‘not 
gross’ or manufactured and were made in the process of the ordinary function of 
the family147 to protect the applicant’s and the children’s interests, particularly 
when no other avenue of evidence collection was open to the applicant.148  
The proximity of threat and the immediacy of non-consensual recording 
usages, to protect lawful interests, has been a point of analysis for courts.149 In 
cases involving potential allegations of DFV, the courts are more likely to reject 
arguments regarding lawful interest if the recorded material is historical in nature 
or the recording is not used with relative immediacy. For example, in Huffman 
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and Gorman,150 the applicant father made a number of non-consensual recordings 
detailing incidents of conflict and violence between himself and the respondent. 
The recordings took place over a two-year period between 2006 and 2008 using a 
dictaphone. Transcripts of six tapes were then adduced in evidence at the 
commencement of proceedings in 2013. Foster J decided that the transcript 
material should not be put before the Single Expert in this case.151 On its face, 
there is an apparent conflict of rationale between Huffman and Latham given that 
the latter recordings were essentially made in ‘the process of the ordinary 
function of the family’ and consequently not in contemplation of future legal 
actions as a protective measure. The importance of the evidence, its probative 
value, and other public policy considerations are important factors in these cases 
and are key to determining both lawful interests and the admissibility of the 
recording into evidence in these types of cases.152  
Finally, it is worth examining the small number of cases where children have 
been used as agents for recordings. These cases are not directly relevant to court 
constructions of what is a lawful interest, but they are worded strongly enough to 
infer future decisions on this exact topic are not likely to be classified as a 
justifiable lawful interest of self-protection. Callahan and Callahan153 regarded a 
recording of a phone conversation by the child of the applicant and respondent. 
The question before the Court concerned a potential breach of section 11 of the 
Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW), which relates to the publication or 
communication of a private conversation, and whether the transcript of the 
conversation should be admitted. Scarlett J contended that it should not and was 
unambiguous as to his reasoning. He observed that the court has a discretion to 
exclude improperly or illegally obtained evidence by virtue of section 138(1) of 
the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), but he was  
… not satisfied that the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the 
undesirability of admitting evidence that has been obtained by a child recording a 
telephone conversation with his mother and passing it on to his father. It is not 
desirable to encourage or even condone a child taking a partisan attitude to 
proceedings between his parents.154 
A similar rationale was employed in Alexander and Turner155 which dealt 
with the more acute problem of whether a non-consensual recording by a child 
could be used as evidence of a breach of a non-denigration parenting order. The 
youngest child, Y, recorded a video conversation of the applicant and Y’s step-
mother and then provided a copy of the recording to Y’s mother some  
months later. The reason for Y’s action was unclear but it was admitted by the 
applicant that the video contained footage in which he denigrated Y’s mother, in  
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Y’s presence.156 The applicant tried to exclude the video on the basis that its 
collection and use breached section 6 of the Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic). 
One of the issues that the Court had to resolve was whether the admission of  
the recording was necessary to protect Y’s legal interests.157 This gave rise to 
competing public policy considerations, especially regarding the role of children 
as surreptitious evidence collectors.158 
The final case pertinent to these issues is Simmons and Simmons. 159  In 
Simmons, the mother placed a recording device on her child so that she could 
record supervised time with the child’s father. The father had also used 
conversations with the child to encourage uncooperative behaviour by the child 
that could be used as evidence for a complaint to authorities. McGuire J decided 
to admit the recorded evidence, but not before roundly criticising both parties.160 
 
C   Summary 
The brief overview of legislation and judicial decisions reveals some of the 
fragmentation concerns raised by the ALRC, demonstrating a range of different 
foundational definitions which trigger different legal consequences in relation to 
the admissibility of smartphone recordings as evidence. Before we outline some 
key points of fragmentation regarding how the law would apply to the study 
findings, we first note the more readily identifiable considerations, particularly in 
relation to the admission of recordings as evidence. As detailed in the cases 
above, in the context of the study findings and DFV cases in general, a 
smartphone will most likely be regarded as a listening device in relation to all 
jurisdictional listening and surveillance device laws.161 Similarly, it is likely that 
conversations conducted either at home or elsewhere, such as child handover 
locations in public, would be classed as private conversations.162 Accordingly, 
most, if not all, of the conversations as described in the study would be 
classifiable as ‘private conversations’. The more complex question regards the 
application of the participant monitoring and lawful interests exemptions, and it 
is here that the ALRC’s concerns become readily visible. 
In many ways, the interviewees highlight the very concern that the ALRC 
noted about the participant monitoring exemption, namely, that a party to a 
conversation should not be able to infringe the privacy of the other party, by 
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covertly recording a conversation when there is a reasonable belief that it should 
be private.163 As regards application to the study, it is important to note that all of 
the interviews were undertaken in Queensland. As such, all of the women who 
reported the use of non-consensual recording techniques would be able to rely on 
the participant monitoring exemption, as they are each a party to the conversation 
and therefore do not require the consent of the other party to make the 
recording. 164  The complex issue of admissibility of recorded evidence as a 
protective mechanism requires virtually no judicial consideration in the context 
of participant monitoring, which is clearly a positive aspect for victims seeking to 
rely on this evidence.  
However, the same could also be said for perpetrator recordings if, again, the 
perpetrator is a party to the conversation, even if those recordings are used for 
intimidation and control. In terms of the study findings, these would include the 
ex-partner recordings of Angelina on her doorstep and of Pari in the library and 
on the phone. In that sense, the participant monitoring exemption could provide a 
broad ranging protection potentially for both perpetrators and victims alike, 
where both the perpetrator and the victim are parties to the conversation. The 
breadth of the exemption is potentially tempered by the application of section 
138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which would provide judicial discretion 
regarding the admission of evidence obtained improperly. However, it is difficult 
to see how either a perpetrator or victim could be considered to have acted 
improperly in making a recording of a conversation they are both parties to.  
This point re-emphasises the ALRC’s concern about the breadth of the 
participant monitoring exemption, particularly in the context of ‘readily available 
consumer technologies that allow for surreptitious recording’.165 The only types 
of surreptitious recordings not covered by the exemption are those more radical 
situations of secret or illicit installation of listening devices, such as the Leaving 
Domestic Violence Study reports of Leah, Martha and Fiona, where the 
perpetrator is clearly not a party to a conversation with the victim.  
As we have noted above, the use of smartphones is becoming increasingly 
ubiquitous, which significantly challenges the basis of different jurisdictional 
exemptions for admitting non-consensual recordings as evidence. If, for example, 
the study interviewees resided in New South Wales or South Australia, then they 
could not, of course, rely on a participant monitoring exemption and would 
instead have to demonstrate to a court that the non-consensual recording was 
reasonably necessary to protect their lawful interests, before it could be admitted. 
As detailed above, this is a very different consideration which places a significant 
evidential burden on victims. The benefits of the participant monitoring 
exemption for victims now become apparent because all study interviewees, who 
used recordings as a protection, would now have to demonstrate a lawful interest 
in the recording to secure its admission as evidence. Uncertainties increase 
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further for victims given that, as highlighted above, judicial considerations on 
this point vary significantly, particularly in relation to the facts of any given case. 
The New South Wales and South Australian courts appear willing to find a 
lawful interest, particularly in DFV situations, where the threat is severe or where 
the potential criminal activity is serious.166 Roseanna’s use of phone recordings 
that captured her ex-partner’s admission of prior criminal assault is a case in 
point. Furthermore, it would appear that if a party can demonstrate a substantial 
link between the seriousness of the threat and the use of the recording to protect 
their interest, then the courts are more likely to define a lawful interest in the 
action.167 Thus, those interviewees, such as Laura and Jennifer, who can establish 
a direct link between past incidents of DFV and the recordings, are more likely to 
be successful in arguing that the recordings should be admitted as evidence.  
Less clear cut are situations where the threat is not so serious or the threat is 
not immediate.168 In terms of the study, those interviewees who were recording 
conversations for private and personal longer-term purposes, such as Vera and 
Martha, may encounter more difficulties in having the recordings admitted as 
evidence under the lawful interests exemption.169 Similarly, those interviewees, 
namely Ingrid and Sandra, who simply recorded all interactions would also 
possibly encounter admissibility issues before the courts because the recordings 
were not undertaken for a specific protective purpose that could be directly 
linked to some form of DFV. In these cases, it would appear that the courts will 
assess whether a lawful interest arises on a case-by-case basis in relation to the 
factual circumstances presented.170 The distance between the perceived threat and 
the temporal use of the recording will be a factor that the courts consider, 
particularly in the context of the evidential value of the recording. The greater the 
temporal distance, and thus the less evidential value, the more likely that a lawful 
interest will not be found. Thus, simply recording conversations without a 
specified protective and legal use, will more likely mean that the recordings will 
not be admitted as evidence. This could have a detrimental effect on the 
admissibility of recordings undertaken by some of the study’s interviewees. 
Maddy, who recorded conversations to ‘just … keep a record’ and Sandra who 
recorded everything and ‘was always armed’ would be situations in point. 
Equally, it can be inferred that a court is very unlikely to identify a lawful 
interest in admitting illicit recordings if the recording party uses their children to 
make the recording.171 This is an important point given that findings from the 
interview study indicate that recording of child handover points was relatively 
common, as this was a site of potential conflict recorded by Sandra, Rosa and 
Milly. However, if recordings are undertaken to protect a child’s interest, such as 
in Rosa’s case, then it is more likely that the recording will be admitted as part of 
a lawful interest.  
                                                 
166  See, eg, Groom (2015) 252 A Crim R 332; R v Coutts [2013] SADC 50. 
167  See, eg, Corby [2015] FCCA 1099. 
168  See, eg, Huffman & Gorman [2014] FamCA 150. See also Huffman [No 2] [2014] FamCA 1077. 
169  See, eg, Sepulveda (2006) 167 A Crim R 108; Gawley v Bass (2016) 313 FLR 346. 
170  See, eg, Groom (2015) 252 A Crim R 332. 
171  See, eg, Alexander and Turner [2015] FCCA 3197; Simmons [2013] FCCA 304. 
182 UNSW Law Journal Volume 41(1) 
This brief overview of the key judicial considerations regarding the 
application of the participant monitoring and lawful interests exemptions 
highlights the fragmentation concerns presented by the ALRC and the uncertain 
application of different regimes to the same issues of DFV. It should also be 
noted that our research only covers the application of the participant monitoring 
and lawful interests exemptions and does not cover the other three types of 
exemption identified by the ALRC.172 In that sense, there is likely to be a greater 
degree of fragmentation and uneven application when the use of exemption 
considerations are extended to all jurisdictions, as both individual rights and 
liabilities in this area ‘are highly contingent upon their location’.173 With that in 
mind, we conclude our article by highlighting some key points for future 
discussion, most notably regarding the suitability of listening devices law as a 
means for admitting evidence and, in doing so, we argue that a broader 
jurisprudential understanding of privacy and surveillance in the context of DFV 
is required.  
 
V   CONCLUSION 
Our analysis demonstrates the uncertainty that prevails around the lawfulness 
of recording others via smartphone in the context of DFV. While prosecutions  
of stalking and intimidation involving non-consensual recording appear to be 
rare, it is likely that non-consensual recording is part of the coercive and 
controlling behaviour that underlies some women’s experiences of DFV, some 
applications for DFVOs and subsequent charges of breach of a DFVO. 174 
Notably, prosecutions under listening device statutes, especially in the context of 
DFV, are rare. However, the lawful interests provisions have been considered by 
the courts on a number of occasions in the context of determining the 
admissibility of recordings covertly obtained. While many cases have considered 
that where a lawful interest can be demonstrated, the recorded evidence will be 
admissible, many of the decisions also identify an alternative way to examine this 
question. That is, despite the recording being improperly or illegally obtained, on 
application of the discretionary exclusion under evidence law, public policy 
considerations will be considered (including the probative value of the evidence, 
its importance and the impropriety of the contravention) and the recording may 
be admissible.175  
A person’s actions in recording another person could be a criminal offence of 
stalking or breach of a DFVO, and at the same time the recording could be 
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admitted into evidence. Where a DFVO includes a condition prohibiting parties 
recording each other, recording the other party will clearly be a breach of the 
order. However, where parties rely on conditions of good behaviour or that they 
not commit domestic or family violence, it seems less clear whether the 
recording would be determined to be a breach of the DFVO. In any event, even if 
the DFVO is breached by the recording behaviour, the recording may still be 
admissible – and may make the breach worthwhile for the perpetrator. Similarly, 
whether a person commits an offence of stalking by recording another party will 
depend on the circumstances and in many cases will depend on whether an 
‘ordinary person’ would apprehend or fear further harm as a result of the 
recording. Yet again, the recording obtained while undertaking the unlawful 
stalking activity may still be held to be admissible in evidence.176  
In their 2010 report, Family Violence: A National Legal Response, the ALRC 
and NSWLRC identified inconsistent definitions of domestic and family violence 
across jurisdictions and recommended a consistent approach be introduced.177 
Given the diversity of the contexts of DFV in which smartphone recording now 
takes place and the reasons for it, it seems impossible to be sure in what contexts 
it will be legally undertaken. This complexity is increased manifold by the 
fragmentation issues identified by the ALRC regarding the listening and 
surveillance device legal regime. In this sense, the diversity of DFV contexts 
buttresses head-first into the fractured listening devices regime which can have 
the effect of applying equal protections for perpetrators and victims alike, under 
the participant monitoring exemption, and uneven application to victims, under 
the lawful interests exemption.  
Furthermore, the question of whether a smartphone recording is legally 
undertaken at the time may have little or no bearing on whether the recording 
itself will later be admissible in evidence. Individuals may be placing themselves 
at risk of prosecution, while at the same time, judges will respond to individual 
fact scenarios in an ad hoc, case-by-case way to assess the admissibility of the 
recording. A blanket response that essentially penalises victim smartphone 
recordings for protective measures may have the effect of punishing abused 
women by removing a key protection mechanism, the use of non-consensual 
recordings as evidence, as identified in the study. However, the blunt application 
of the participant monitoring exemption may effectively protect abusers who use 
smartphone recording as a way of intimidating their partners or former partners, 
as well as victims. 
The ALRC clearly indicated that, in its view, the participant monitoring 
exemption should be repealed because the ‘protections offered by surveillance 
device laws are significantly undermined if a party to a private activity (including 
a private conversation) may record the activity without the knowledge or consent 
of other parties’. 178  In essence, expectations of individual privacy protection 
would be undermined by covert recording activities and this could lead to a 
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‘chilling effect’ that discourages free participation in private conversations, 
particularly in an age where consumer technologies that facilitate surreptitious 
recording are now commonplace.179  
With the accessibility of smartphones, recording is now at our fingertips and 
we are able to do it with the press of a button. According to some of the women 
interviewed in the Leaving Domestic Violence Study, police and lawyers are, in 
some cases, encouraging people experiencing DFV to record their partners. Many 
judicial officers, through admission of recordings made by parties to proceedings, 
implicitly encourage this behaviour as well. Should we accept that recording is 
ubiquitous and amend our statutes to reflect this? This would clearly avoid 
uncertainty. However, this approach risks the ‘chilling effect’ identified by the 
ALRC 180  and, in the context of DFV, places many people at risk of the 
harassment and intimidation experienced by being illicitly recorded. 
It should also be noted that, whilst there are a limited number of judgments 
on this topic, the vast majority of cases have been decided in the last three years. 
This rash of decisions, in conjunction with the reports of the interviewees 
detailed above, highlight that the admissibility of non-consensual recordings as 
evidence in cases involving DFV is an important issue across the Australian 
jurisdictions. Thus far, there has been no indication from either the 
Commonwealth or state governments about the ALRC’s recommendation to 
replace the participant monitoring exemption. If legislative reform is not going to 
emanate, then it is important for courts to identify the conceptual and 
jurisprudential basis for assessing lawful interests in the context of DFV, from a 
broader privacy context, that considers the role of privacy in the circumstance of 
coercive control and protections of autonomy, rather than by a compatibility 
assessment based on the case-by-case evaluation of surveillance and listening 
device legislation.  
Doing so will give effect to Stark’s well-founded observation that DFV is a 
liberty crime in which victims are not free to live their lives as they desire.181 
However, in order to achieve this, the courts will have to develop a broader 
jurisprudential understanding of privacy as a protector and facilitator of 
individual autonomy rather than an ad hoc, factual balancing metric to assess the 
admissibility of evidence decisions. This is not an easy task for a common law 
jurisdiction that is generally bereft of historical or contemporary considerations 
of privacy and has yet to consider the gendered context of technologically-
facilitated DFV. However, we contend that Australian courts and law will have to 
consider this point deeply if future judicial decisions are to keep pace with the 
increasingly complex relationships of surveillance and technological ubiquity in 
the DFV context.  
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